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The Explanation of Action in History1
1. Introduction
This paper focuses on two conflations which frequently appear within the philosophy of history and other
fields concerned with action explanation. The first of these, which I call the Conflating View of Reasons,
states that the reasons for which we perform actions are reasons why (those events which are) our actions
occur. The second, more general conflation, which I call the Conflating View of Action Explanation,
states that whatever explains why an agent performed a certain action explains why (that event which
was) her action occurred. Both conflations ignore the fact that there are at least two distinct objects that
legitimately qualify as objects of action explanation2. As Jennifer Hornsby (1993) has previous
suggested, one thing we might wish to explain is ‘why did A do what she did?’ another is, ‘why did the
event of her doing it occur?’
I shall argue that when these two views are combined they give rise to a futile debate about
explanation in the philosophies of history and the social sciences, and to an almost identical debate
in moral psychology and the philosophy of mind. In so doing, I shall also examine a proposed
distinction between explaining a phenomenon, and rendering it intelligible. I conclude by
distinguishing between four different objects of historical understanding, each of which is to be
understood in the light of the aforementioned distinctions between event and thing done, and
explanation and intelligibility.
2. Two Debates about Covering Laws
Philosophers of history can be roughly divided into two camps with regard to explanation. The first
positivist camp, commonly referred to as either covering-law theorists or (to use Quentin Skinner’s
term) social science naturalists include Carl G. Hempel (1942), Patrick Gardiner (1952), John
Passmore (1958), K. Popper (1959), Ernest Nagel (1960), Maurice Mandelbaum (1961), and even
A.J. Ayer (1967). Social science naturalists maintain that historical explanation is a subset of
scientific explanation and, consequently, relies upon causal laws (e.g. of socio-economy) from
which we can deduce the occurrence (or the probability thereof) of historical events. Thus, for
example, Hempel writes:
Consider, for example, the statement that the Dust Bowl farmers migrate to California
‘because’ continual drought and sandstorms render their existence increasingly
precarious, and because California seems to them to offer so much better living
conditions. This explanation rests on some such universal hypothesis as that populations
will tend to migrate to regions which offer better living conditions.3
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The opposing camp, which we might label the anti-naturalists includes Benedetto Croce (1921), R.
G. Collingwood (1946), P.H. Nowell-Smith (1956), William Dray (1957 & 1963), Peter Winch
(1958), Isaiah Berlin (1960), Wilhelm Dilthey (1961), Alan Donagan (1962), von Wright (1971),
and Rüdiger Bittner (2001). Anti-naturalists argue that historical explanation does not involve any
causal laws but rather the citing of reasons for which key figures in history - whose decisions have
had a profound and direct influence on the course of history - acted as they did, reasons which,
according to this second camp, need not be reducible to causes. William Dray, for example, writes:
The function of an explanation is to resolve puzzlement of some kind. When a historian
sets out to explain a historical action, his problem is usually that he does not know what
reason the agent had for doing it. To achieve understanding, what he seeks is information
about what the agent believes to be the facts of his situation, including the likely results
of taking various courses of action considered open to him, and what he wanted to
accomplish…For explanations of the kind just illustrated, I should argue, the
establishment of a deductive logical connection between explanans and explanandum,
based on the inclusion of suitable empirical laws in the former, is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition of explaining.4
The second debate I have in mind is a debate in moral psychology (and the philosophy of mind on
general) about whether or not reason-giving explanations of our actions rely upon causal laws.
Tellingly, we can refer to participants this debate using labels borrowed from the aforementioned
debate on historical explanation. Indeed a number of philosophers (e.g. Hempel, von Wright, and
Bittner) appear in both. So what exactly does this second debate amount to?
First, there are those who think that all reason-giving explanation of our actions is a subset of
scientific explanation and, consequently, relies upon causal laws. These covering-law theorists
include C. J. Ducasse (1925), Carl G. Hempel (1962), Donald Davidson (1963 & 1976), Alvin I.
Goldman (1969), Thomas Nagel (1970), Peter Railton (1978), Fred Dretske (1988), Al Mele (1992),
Rowland Stout (1996), Jim Lenman (1996), Gregory Kimble (1996), and John Searle (2001). So,
for example, Davidson writes:
I emphasized the role of causality in our understanding of action, urging that an
appropriate belief and desire could explain, and be the reasons for, an action only if they
caused it…There is a weak sense in which laws may be said to be involved which is not
in dispute…if A causes B, there must be descriptions of A and B which show that A and
B fall under a law.5
The opposing anti-naturalist camp denies this, maintaining that it is a sufficient condition of a
reason-giving explanation of action that the reason cited renders the action intelligible. Chief
proponents of this view include A.R. Louch (1966), Alan White (1967), D. G. Brown (1968),
Norman Malcolm (1968), G. H. von Wright (1971), Arthur Collins (1997), Frederick Stoutland
(1998), Jonathan Dancy (2000), and G. F. Schueler (2003). Thus, for example, Bittner writes that:
Reason explanations…explain an action by reference to an earlier state or event, which is
the reason…A reason makes us understand something done for that reason not because
there is a law to the effect that, given the state or event that is the reason, an agent
produces action of this sort, for there may be no such law. A reason makes us understand
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something done for a reason not because it informs us of the causal history of the action,
since for all we know it may not do that. A reason makes us understand something done
for that reason not because reason and action can be encoded in some story form, for
perhaps they cannot: people’s doing things for reasons need not come in preformed
plots. It seems, then, that the explanatory force of reason explanations cannot be reduced
to that of some other type of historical explanation. It seems that the explanatory force of
reason explanations is just their own.6
We might do well to view the above debates (concerning historical explanation and reason-giving
explanation) as part of an overarching question of whether or not social science (including history,
anthropology, criminology, and economic and political theory) is a branch of natural science. It is
to this larger question that I now turn.
3. The Conflating View of Action Explanation
Those who think that social science is a branch of natural science (e.g. Ducasse 1925, Hempel
1965, and Kuhn 1970) will likely side with the covering-law theorists in both debates outlined
above, whereas those who deny that social science is a natural science (e.g. Winch 1958, Berlin
1974, Mahajan 1992) will more likely take the non-naturalist view of action explanation.7 Consider
the following general claim by Ducasse:
Explanation essentially consists in the offering of a hypothesis of fact, standing to the
fact to be explained as case of antecedent to case of consequent of some already known
law of causation.8
This belief that all explanation is deductive-nomological (i.e. that ‘a statement reporting the
occurrence of the event being explained may be deduced from a statement describing the cause of
the event together with a generalization backed by causal laws.’) commits him the view that both
historical and everyday reason-giving explanation of action must be deductive-nomological.
Conversely, any philosopher who follows Peter Winch in claiming that no social behaviour
whatsoever, no matter how conceived, is to be understood as being causally regulative (but only as
‘rule-following’ behaviour), is committed to the view that neither historical nor everyday reason-
giving explanation of action could ever be deductive-nomological.
Charles Taylor has summed up this general division of outlooks on human behaviour in the
following way:
It is often said that human behaviour…is in some way fundamentally different from the
processes in nature which are studied by the natural sciences…Against this view stands
the opinion of many others, in particular of many students of the sciences of human
behaviour, that there is no difference in principle between the behaviour of animate
organisms and any other processes in nature, that the former can be accounted for in the
same way as the latter, by laws relating physical events…Now the issue between these
two views is one of fundamental and perennial importance for what is often called
philosophical anthropology, the study of the basic categories in which man and his
behaviour is to be described and explained.9
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My claim is that we should not attempt to resolve the issue in question by taking one of the two
sides Taylor mentions above, for they both make the mistake of conflating the explanation of why
an (event that was an) action occurred with the explanation of why one or more people performed a
certain action, and in so doing subscribe to a Conflating View of Action Explanation (CVAE).
CVAE: Whatever explains why we act explains why our actions occur.
Yet it is far from obvious that in explaining why someone did something we will have also
explained why the action which was their doing (of) that thing occurred. Since only the latter object
of explanation concerns an event in the natural world, we might consistently (indeed, I shall argue,
advisedly) hold that while explanations of why our actions occur must rely upon causal laws,
explanations of why we do things (which are not concerned with events at all) cannot.
If I am right about this, then both covering-law theorists and anti-naturalists are wrong to maintain
of everything that might reasonably count as an explanation of action either that it either must or
that it cannot rely on causal laws. This is not to say that there might be no either/or regarding any
specific object of explanation, but only that our answer will depend on what the nature of the
particular object in question.
Many an anti-naturalist has argued against covering-law theorists that they:
Are forced into a mistaken view of their subject-matter as a result of their preoccupation
with a method they take to be necessary to any respectable enquiry.10
I shall try to show that this is true. But I shall also argue that a covering-law theorist might
complain, with equal right, that anti-naturalists have been forced into a mistaken view of their
subject matter as a result of a preoccupation with a method which they (equally mistakenly) take to
be necessary to any enquiry regarding human affairs.
4. Explanation and Intelligibility
The claim that there is more to explaining than ‘merely’ rendering intelligible is based on the idea
that once an action has been rendered intelligible we will have understood why someone would or
might do it, but not why they actually did it. The thought here is that the reasons any given agent
might have for acting could easily render any number of possible actionsintelligible (i.e. for any set
of considerations which we might state, a number of equally intelligible courses of action may be
available to her), but they could hardly explain them all. Explanation, it is claimed, can only be
achieved if we can show that the action occurred because the agent had this reason or that (where
the ‘because’ is typically understood causally). Writing specifically about historical explanation,
John Passmore makes such a move:
[E]xplanation by reference to a “principle of action” or a “good reason” is not, by itself,
explanation at all…For a reason may be a “good reason” - in a sense of being a principle
to which one could appeal in justification of one’s action - without having in fact the
slightest influence on us.11
Similarly, in a paper whose main target is William Dray’s contention that the popular method of
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explaining actions in terms of underlying reasons which agents act in the light of cannot be
construed as conforming to the covering-law pattern, Hempel writes that:
[T]o show that an action was the appropriate or rational thing to have done under the
circumstances is not to explain why in fact it was done…[T]he presentation of an action
as being appropriate to a given situation, as making sense, cannot, for purely logical
reasons, serve to explain why in fact the action was taken.12
Such arguments appear compelling since, assuming that the aforementioned distinction between
intelligibility and explanation stands (and it certainly has some intuitive plausibility), our citing the
reasons for which the agent acted would not amount to an explanation of her action unless we added
(if only by implication) that those reasons moved or motivated her to act. Thus, reasons must be
identified with causes, the argument continues, on pain of not being able to explain action.
An influential expression of such an argument appears in Thomas Nagel’s The View from Nowhere:
Everything that I do or that anyone else does is part of a larger course of events that no
one “does,” but that happens, with or without explanation…There is no room in an
objective picture of the world for an explanation of action that is not causal…The
alternative form of explanation doesn’t really explain the action at all… When someone
makes an autonomous choice such as whether to accept a job, and there are reasons on
both sides of the issue, we are supposed to be able to explain why he did what he did by
pointing to his reasons for accepting it. But we could equally have explained his refusing
the job, if he had refused, by referring to the reasons on the other side – and he could
have refused for those other reasons: that is the essential claim of autonomy. It applies
even if one choice is significantly more reasonable than the other. Bad reasons are
reasons too.
Intentional explanation, if there is such a thing, can explain either choice in terms of the
appropriate reasons, since either choice would be intelligible if it occurred. But for this
very reason it cannot explain why this person accepted the job for the reasons in favor
instead of refusing it for the reasons against. It cannot explain on grounds of
intelligibility why one of two intelligible courses of action, both of which were possible,
occurred. And even where it can account for this in terms of further reasons, there will
be a point at which the explanation gives out. We say that someone’s character and
values are revealed by the choices he makes in such circumstances, but if these are
indeed independent conditions, they too must either have or lack an explanation.
If autonomy requires that the central element of choice be explained in a way that does
not take us outside the point of view of the agent (leaving aside the explanation of what
faces him with the choice), then intentional explanations must simply come to an end
when all available reasons have been given, and nothing else can take over where they
leave off. But this seems to mean that an autonomous intentional explanation cannot
explain precisely what it is supposed to explain, namely why I did what I did rather than
the alternative that was causally open to me. It says I did it for certain reasons, but does
not explain why I didn’t decide not to do it for other reasons. It may render the action
subjectively intelligible, but it does not explain why this rather than another equally
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possible and comparably intelligible action was done. That seems to be something for
which there is no explanation, either intentional or causal.13
There are (at the very least) five distinct objects of explanation which Nagel seems to be conflating
here: (1) why I did something (2) why my action (of doing it) occurred (3) why I did something for
reason x rather than omit to do it (for reason y) (4) why I did something for reason x rather than
something else (for reason x or y) (5) why I did something rather than something else (irrespective
of any agential reasons).
Yet surely one can explain the first (why I did something) without explaining the second, third,
fourth, or fifth. Suppose, for example, that I stay home for the reason that there will be too many
people that I don’t know at the party I have been invited to. Remaining neutral, for the moment, as
to whether or not the above statement provides an explanation of why I stayed home, what is
certain is that it does not explain why I stayed at home instead of going to the cinema instead. For
an explanation of this we might add that I was tired, do not like the cinema, that nothing I wished
to see was playing etc. Likewise, to explain why I did not go to the party for the reason that there
were many people there that I didn’t know, we must add a further reason e.g. that I am shy and/or
have barely enough time for my close friends and relatives (after all if I had a different character, or
was in a different situation, I might have gone to the party precisely because there were many
people there that I didn’t know). This further reason need not (though it could) be an agential
reason in the sense that it need not be a reason that I acted for or upon (indeed it need not even be
something I am aware of), but only something which explains, perhaps causally, why the reason I
did act upon had that kind of influence on me (and, depending on the example, perhaps also why
some other reason didn’t have a stronger pull towards some other direction). For any given
situation, there are numerous objects of action explanation, and no reason to expect that they must
all share the same explanans (or even the same type of explanans). What Nagel calls an ‘intentional
explanation’ (an explanation in terms of what I have called ‘agential reasons’) will only suit certain
kinds of objects of action explanation, but it would be a mistake to infer from the fact that it cannot
explain them all that it cannot explain any of them. Yet in conflating (1)-(5), this is exactly what
Nagel has done. In so doing, he appears to accept both of the following:
CVAE: Whatever explains why we act explains why our actions occur.
CVR: The reasons for which we act are reasons why our actions occur.
Focusing on occurrences for a moment, we might also add that it is one thing to explain why an
event (say, an action) occurred, and quite another to explain why it occurred rather than some other
event. In the first instance, it might be sufficient to show why the occurrence was probable, in the
latter we would need to show that it was more probable than the competing alternative, and one can
imagine an scenario where what needs to be shown is that the occurrence was inevitable. In each
case, however, our object of explanation will be different. Under no circumstance, however, would
the fact that one has not shown the occurrence of any given action (say that of my staying at home)
to be inevitable suggest that one must have therefore failed to explain why anybody acted as they
did (e.g. why I stayed at home instead of going to the party). Returning to the arguments offered by
Passmore and Hempel above, we can now see that they falsely assume that one cannot explain why
an action was performed unless one has shown that it (by which they mean its occurrence) was
inevitable. But we have now seen that such requirements on explanation are at best misguided.
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Considerations which render actions intelligible typically lead to an understanding of why the agent
might have acted as she did. But if we also happen to know that these considerations were indeed
the ones the agent acted upon we will have also understood why she actually acted as she did. As
Stephen Toulmin once noted in a different context:
If you protest that I must have some explanation (still meaning a ‘scientific’ one), that is
your mistake; for there are some situations in which the demand for a scientific
explanation is out of place.14
Once we appreciate that such difficulties arise only because of the various aforementioned
conflations, we come to see that there is no unbridgeable gap between rendering a person’s action
intelligible, and explaining why it was performed, though we might wish to say that, strictly
speaking, what explains why A did X is not her reason for performing the action tout court but a
statement which specifies her reason for performing the action. To the extent that the study of
history (or for that matter anthropology, criminology, and economic and political theory) is
interested in such qu/estions, they cannot hope to offer scientific explanations. But, of course,
history (and social science in general) is just as often interested in other objects of action
explanation, including many which may call for radically different methodologies, some more
scientific than others. The explanation of a particular trend or tendency, for example, or the
occurrence of a historical event such as the collapse of a nation’s stock market and the depression
that ensued may well be deductive-nomological (I take it that ‘verstehende erklaerung’ - Weber’s
‘ideal type’ interpretive causal explanations - would also fall into this category).
In his influential book Theory of Action Lawrence Davis writes:
While the explanation of Sam’s action aims at displaying the action’s intelligibility…
explanation of… a “mere” event, aims at displaying its inevitability. Reasons-
explanations and causal-explanations differ, then, in their aims and the battery of
concepts that apply to them.15
There is much truth to this remark, though in order to get to it we must restrict the object of action
explanation to ‘why Sam did what he did’ and not ‘why Sam’s action occurred’ (Davis’s use of the
term ‘mere’ betrays the fact that he is conflating the two, by suggesting that reasons-explanations
are also explanations of events). For while we may do things for reasons (that help explain our
actions by rendering them intelligible), the events which are our actions (of doing these things) are
neither things we do, nor things that occur for reasons. As for the purported difference between
reasons-explanations and causal-explanations, this difference is real only if we take reasons-
explanations to be explanations which give our reasons for acting. But a reasons-explanation of
action could equally reasonably be conceived of as an explanation in terms of non-agential reasons
which explain why an action was performed, or even why an event that happens to be an action
occurred. If our object of explanation is of the first type, we will be first and foremost interested in
psychological intelligibility; if it is of the second, our enquiry is more likely to concern itself with
questions of probability and inevitability.
5. Four Objects of Historical Understanding
I wish to end by suggesting that we ought to distinguish between (at least) four different sets of
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/sandis.html[9/18/2009 5:09:46 PM]
objects of historical understanding16:
1) Rendering a historical event intelligible leads to an understanding of (i.e. explains)
why/how/when/where it might have occurred.
2) Explaining a historical event leads to an understanding of (i.e. explains)
why/how/when/where it did occur.
3) Rendering it intelligible why/how/when/where a person performed an action (of
historical significance) leads to an understanding of (i.e. explains) why/how/when/where
she might have done what she did.
4) Explaining why/how/when/where a person performed an action (of historical
significance) leads to an understanding of (i.e. explains) why she actually did what she
did.
To insist that the explanation of action in history either must be or cannot be deductive-nomological
is to lose sight of one or more of these.
Constantine Sandis
Oxford Brookes University
Notes
1. This paper was first presented (under the title ‘Objects of Explanation in the Social Sciences’) at
the Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Understanding conference, Vrije Universiteit,
Amsterdam, 25-7 August 2005. I wish to thank the organizers of the conferences (Henk W. de
Regt, Sabina Leonelli, and Kai Eigner) as well as those who partook in the discussion for their
encouragement and ideas, and the Evert Willem Beth Foundation and University of Reading for
their financial support. I would also like to thank Jonathan Dancy, David Dolby, John Preston,
Sabine Roeser, Michael Smith, and Galen Strawson for their most helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
2. I actually follow Achinstein (1975) in thinking that the number of objects of action explanation is
legion since for any given action (even under a specific description) we can ask an endless string of
questions relating to where, how, why, and when, each of which is seeking an explanation of
something different e.g. ‘when did the event of her walking occur ?’, ‘why did she walk so slowly?
’, ‘where did she walk to?’, ‘why did she walk rather than run?’, ‘how did she walk so far?’, ‘why
she walk this way rather than that’, etc. Further below I look at a passage where Thomas Nagel
conflates at least five such different objects.
3. Hempel 1942: para 5.2.
4. Dray 1962: 68-70.
5. Davidson 1976: 262.
6. Bittner 2001: 88-9.
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7. This is not to say that there are no exceptions. Popper, for example, defends the hypothetico-
deductive model of historical explanation while rejecting (for a variety of reasons including the
denial of determinism) the more general thesis that social science can be modelled on the natural
sciences (Popper 1957: section 15). Similarly, Davidson also defends the hypothetico-deductive
model of reason-giving explanation of action, but denies that there are any bridging laws linking
psychological propositions to natural ones (1970 & 1976: 262).
8. Ducasse: 1925: 150ff.
9. Taylor 1964: 3.
10. Louch 1966:5.
11. Passmore 1958:275, emphasis in the original.
12. Hempel 1963: 102 & 105.
13. Nagel 1986: 114-7, the emphasis is mine. In a footnote, Nagel adds that ‘Lucas notices this but
is not, I think, sufficiently discouraged by it: “There remains a tension between the programme of
complete explicability and the requirements of freedom. If men have free will, then no complete
explanation of their actions can be given, except by reference to themselves. We can give their
reasons. But we cannot explain why their reasons were reasons for them…Asked why I acted, I give
my reasons: asked why I chose to accept them as reasons, I can only say ‘I just did’” [Lucas 1970:
171-2].
14. Toulmin 1964: 96.
15. Davis 1979: 85.
16. I use the term ‘understanding’ ordinarily, and not in the Weberian sense in which ‘Verstehen’ is
(at lest preliminarily) contrasted with ‘Erklären’.
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